CAPITAL BUDGETS, BORROWING RULES, AND STATE-CAPITAL SPENDING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: POTERBA, JM
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01431-M
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 165-187
• 关键词: GOVERNMENT BUDGETING; infrastructure; political institutions

摘要

This paper compares the level and composition of government spending in U.S. states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets. It also investigates the effects of pay-as-you-go financing rules for capital projects. The empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets. There is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non-capital spending. Pay-as-you-go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non-capital spending.