A MODEL OF MONOPOLY WITH STRATEGIC GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: ANANT, TCA; BASU, K; MUKHERJI, B
• 署名单位: Delhi School of Economics; University of Delhi
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01451-S
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 25-43
• 关键词: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION; INEFFICIENCY; taxation; MULTINATIONAL

摘要

A formal model of firm-government interaction is developed in which the firm chooses the producer price and the government chooses the ad valorem tax rate to maximise revenue collection. This game is then embedded as the second stage of a two-stage game where, in stage 1, the firm gets to choose its technology and therefore its cost function. The main results of the paper are (i) to characterise the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria of the government-firm game (ii) to demonstrate that 'strategic' inefficiency, i.e. the choice of high-cost technologies when lower-cost options are available, is pervasive in these models whenever the government uses ad valorem taxes, and (iii) to show that, if the government's choice between ad valorem tax and specific or per-unit tax is endogenised, then in a perfect equilibrium the government will in fact choose the ad valorem system.