International public goods and contribution productivity differentials

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ihori, T
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01522-1
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 139-154
• 关键词: international public goods; contribution productivity; national welfare

摘要

This paper investigates the impacts of productivity differentials in contributing to the public good on national welfare in the context of non-cooperative voluntary provision of a pure public good. A country with high productivity does not necessarily enjoy high welfare. Subsidizing the other country in a contribution game may lead to a strong paradoxical result, while a lump-sum transfer will lead to a weak paradoxical result. We also explore the relationship between the price of the public good and the size of an open club in a multi-club model.