Interest-group politics under majority rule

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dougan, WR; Snyder, JM
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01528-0
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 49-71
• 关键词: interest groups; political institutions; cooperative games

摘要

We develop a model of interest-group politics in which the groups and coalitions that arise, and the form of redistributive policies sought, are jointly determined. The model generates three key results. First, programs intended to reduce income inequality are more likely to involve direct payments than are programs that redistribute wealth across groups with similar incomes. Second, nonequalizing redistribution is unlikely unless the various participants in the political process face significantly different political and economic costs of obtaining transfers. Third, many policies that induce asymmetries among interest groups also impose significant deadweight costs. Stable nonequalizing redistribution will therefore tend to involve indirect and economically inefficient methods of transferring income.