Rival charities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bilodeau, M; Slivinski, A
• 署名单位: University of Sherbrooke; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00046-7
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 449-467
• 关键词: nonprofit enterprises; public goods; Voluntary contributions; spatial competition

摘要

The paper develops a model in which a number of charities (or other nonprofit firms) provide various bundles of public goods or services through private donations. The motivation for individuals to found and operate such firms is that it allows them to influence the mix of public goods. It is their decisions regarding the allocation of donations across uses that matter in the end. Donors to these firms take into account the allocation decisions that will be made by the organizations to which they contribute. We find a propensity for such organizations to specialize in the provision of services, and further find that diversification by such firms diminishes the equilibrium level of contributions they will collect. We demonstrate the possibility that a commitment by a monopoly charity to an allocation rule that is, ex-post, privately sub-optimal can eliminate this effect, and may therefore be advantageous, ex-ante. The allocation rule which accomplishes this involves honouring donor designations of their contributions to specific uses. This is a policy that is frequently adopted by local chapters of the United Way. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.