Can centralized educational standards raise welfare?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Costrell, RM
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00017-0
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 271-293
• 关键词: educational standards; centralization; decentralization; spillovers; egalitarianism

摘要

I examine conditions under which centralized educational standards raise welfare, compared to decentralization. In this model, a uniform centralized standard only raises welfare when there is excessive cross-district pooling of graduates by employers. High cross-district heterogeneity of students and high degrees of egalitarianism can, surprisingly, favor centralization. In other cases centralization can lower standards in all districts, including the weakest. The cross-district patterns of winners and losers among high-and low-achievers depend crucially on the degree of cross-district pooling. Finally, I show that centralized standards with a local option to set higher standards are always welfare improving. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.