The voluntary provision of a pure public good: The case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Murdoch, JC; Sandler, T
• 署名单位: Iowa State University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01598-8
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 331-349
• 关键词: public good; Montreal Protocol; ozone shield; CFCs; Nash equilibrium

摘要

This paper applies the theory of the voluntary provision of a pure public good to the behavior of nations to curb chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions during the late 1980s. By devising an empirical test, we determine that these cutbacks in emissions are consistent with Nash behavior. When taste parameters are controlled, the relationship between emission cutbacks and national income is nearly linear as implied by the theory. If the sample is purged of potential outliers, then the linear relationship results. A significant taste parameter is the extent of political and civil freedoms, while a marginally significant parameter is geophysical position in terms of latitude.