Privatization, technology choice and aggregate outcomes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hansen, NA
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01618-0
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 425-442
• 关键词: Privatization; TRANSITION; technology choice; multiple equilibria

摘要

We analyze the macroeconomic consequences of privatization policies in transition economies. Due to the particular market structure in those economies, strategic complementarities in restructuring of privatized firms occur, giving rise to multiple macroeconomic equilibria. Restructuring and the resulting macroeconomic outcomes crucially depend on how property rights are distributed and which method of privatization is chosen. Firm sales to single or core investors may easily lead to 'bad' equilibria without restructuring, if employees are given profit claims. This is so even if the workers give up parts of their wages as a compensation for stocks (wage-equity swaps). Contrary to conventional wisdom, mass privatization can have favourable influence on micro-economic efficiency and may therefore lead to a 'good' aggregate outcome. As an additional feature favouring mass privatization, we argue that a Big Bang approach to privatization might lead to a favourable equilibrium.