Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Keen, M; Marchand, M
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00035-2
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 33-53
• 关键词: Tax competition; public expenditure; policy coordination

摘要

Much attention has been given to the impact of fiscal competition on the level of public expenditure, but relatively little to the impact on its composition. Using a broadly familiar and reasonably rich model of fiscal competition in the presence of mobile capital, this paper establishes a systematic bias in public spending patterns: starting from the non-cooperative equilibrium, and holding tax rates constant, welfare would be improved by a coordinated reduction in the provision of local public inputs and a corresponding increase in the public provision of local public goods benefiting immobile consumers. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.