Private government

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Helsley, RW; Strange, WC
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00030-9
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 281-304
• 关键词: clubs; collective goods; privatization; exclusion

摘要

Private governments are voluntary, exclusive organizations that supplement services provided by the public sector. This paper examines resource allocation with and without a private government. We show that the existence of a private government causes the public sector to reduce provision of a collective good. We also show that the private government may be inefficiently small, The welfare effects of private government are complex. Although some agents are made worse off, aggregate nonmember welfare rises. Private government has ambiguous effects on the welfare of members: it is possible that the welfare of those who choose to participate might be lower. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S,A.