Differentiated payroll taxes, unemployment, and welfare

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kolm, AS
• 署名单位: Uppsala University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00019-X
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 255-271
• 关键词: imperfect competition; industry-specific taxation; optimal taxation

摘要

This paper investigates the impact of payroll taxes on unemployment and welfare in a two-sector economy characterised by imperfect competition in product and labour markets. The two sectors differ in market competitiveness. It turns out that only the relative tax pressure affects unemployment and welfare. Unemployment can be reduced by having the less competitive sector pay higher taxes. Moreover, differentiated payroll taxes will, in general, improve efficiency. Which sector to tax relatively more is, however, not clear. The government faces a tradeoff in the sense that unemployment is reduced only at the expense of reduced efficiency in the output mix. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.