Class systems and the enforcement of social norms

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Cole, HL; Mailath, GJ; Postlewaite, A
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00058-9
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 5-35
• 关键词: class; EFFICIENCY; GROWTH; social competition; social norms

摘要

We analyze a model in which there is socially inefficient competition among people. In this model, self-enforcing social norms can potentially control the inefficient competition. However, the inefficient behavior often cannot be suppressed in equilibrium among those with the lowest income due to the ineffectiveness of sanctions against those in the society with the least to lose. We demonstrate that, in such cases, it may be possible for society to be divided into distinct classes, with inefficient behavior suppressed in the upper classes but not in the lower. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.