Externalities vs internalities: a model of political integration

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ellingsen, T
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00090-X
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 251-268
• 关键词: jurisdictions; integration; centralization; public goods; the State

摘要

Decentralized government leads to inter-regional externalities. Whereas an integrated jurisdiction solves the externality problem, centralized government entails other costs-in particular a neglect for minority interests. The paper models formally the trade-off between these two forces in determining the optimum as well as the equilibrium design of jurisdictions. Both the relative size of regions and the distribution of tastes are shown to be important parameters of the problem. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.