Riding free on the signals of others

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alexander-Cook, K; Bernhardt, D; Roberts, J
• 署名单位: Queens University - Canada
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00060-1
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 25-43
• 关键词: increasing returns to scale; incomplete information; free-riding signaling

摘要

This paper looks at the incentives to free-ride on the information signaling of others and shows how this can lead to delay in productive activity and to a cascade of activity once information is signaled. In the presence of increasing returns to scale to a profitable project, an initial pioneer may have to incur short-term losses to signal the opportunity to others. Agents may prefer to defer entry in the hope that others will incur those losses and thereby convey the information. Free-riding is worsened when potential entrants must first choose to acquire a signal about the project, even a costless signal, and this information acquisition is observed. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.