Policy equilibria in a federal system: the effects of higher tax ceilings for unemployment insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hamermesh, DS; Scoones, WD
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Victoria
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00028-6
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 191-213
• 关键词: Unemployment insurance; intergovernmental relations; payroll tax

摘要

In many federal systems a higher authority imposes changes that may alter lower-level policies, depending on the type of change and differences among lower-level parties. For example, we model changes in the parameters of American states' unemployment insurance (UI) systems when the federal government raises the UI tax ceiling. Bargaining among interested parties alters UI benefits and taxes. We estimate a 'difference-in-differences' model describing UI tax payments when federal increases in 1972, 1978 and 1983 increased some states' ceilings. Where the federal constraint was binding taxes rose nearly 20 percent. The theory and empirical analysis suggest themselves as examples for future research on topics in public finance, labor economics and international trade. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.