Strategic risk taking when there is a public good to be provided privately

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Robledo, JR
• 署名单位: Free University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00075-9
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 403-414
• 关键词: risk taking; strategic commitment; private provision of public goods; insurance demand

摘要

We describe a situation where a risk averse individual has a preference for risk taking. In the literature, we find this strategic risk behaviour in an altruistic framework, where the individual actually benefits from his noninsurance only in the loss outcome. In our model, all agents are perfectly selfish. When a public good is to be provided privately after the insurance decision, the player facing greater uncertainty can expect an income transfer from the other individuals through the commitments to the public good. This ex-ante income transfer is not conditional on the loss. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: H41; D81.