Credibility may require discretion, not rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cowen, T; Glazer, A; Zajc, K
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine; George Mason University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00051-1
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 295-306
• 关键词: rules; DISCRETION; credibility; regulation

摘要

We reexamine the common argument that rules produce greater credibility than discretion. Rules limit the actions of agents, restricting observations of the agents' preferences or types. In a second-best world, where rules cannot be everlasting, a regime of discretion in some periods may produce superior credibility and dominate a regime of rules. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.