Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friedman, E; Johnson, S; Kaufmann, D; Zoido-Lobaton, P
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; The World Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00093-6
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 459-493
• 关键词: corruption; over-regulation; taxation; legal system; unofficial economy

摘要

Across 69 countries, higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity. Entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. Dodging the 'grabbing hand' in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total GDP. As a result, corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A, All rights reserved.