Compulsory savings in the welfare state

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Homburg, S
• 署名单位: Leibniz University Hannover
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00106-1
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 233-239
• 关键词: compulsory savings; Welfare state

摘要

According to a widely held belief, compulsory savings are justified on efficiency grounds because they alleviate the following free rider problem: if the welfare state grants a minimum income to older persons, some of the young may find it optimal not to provide for retirement. The literature argues that compulsory savings can be used in order to overcome this problem. However, potential free riders consider compulsory savings as if they were payroll taxes; this holds even if the pension system is actuarially fair. If the resulting labour market distortions are important, it is optimal to accept the free rider problem rather than to introduce a compulsory pension system. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.