Endogenous authoritarian property rights

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Teng, J
• 署名单位: Academia Sinica - Taiwan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00056-0
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 81-95
• 关键词: Property rights; taxation; COMPLEMENTARITY; economies of scope; proprietary state

摘要

Taxation and state enforcement of property rights share many common resources. Both are involved in determining the revenue of the state. Due to these interactions, taxation and property rights enforcement of a proprietary state are complementary. Any change in the administrative capacity of the state that increases the taxation rate also increases the level of property rights enforcement, and vice versa. The capacity and incentive of the proprietary state to tax are also essentially the capacity and incentive to enforce property rights. Extra enforcement powers of the proprietary state might therefore increase rather than decrease production. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.