Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gary-Bobo, RJ; Jaaidane, T
• 署名单位: CY Cergy Paris Universite; Institut Universitaire de France; Universitat d'Alacant
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00059-6
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 203-238
• 关键词: excludable public goods; Revelation of preferences; polling; mechanism design

摘要

We consider a revelation mechanism for the production of public goods. A sample of consumers is drawn at random. Each member of the sample is asked to reveal her(his) preferences; agents are subjected to transfers of the Groves class; and any surplus of taxes collected on sampled agents is redistributed to non-sampled agents. This polling mechanism is non-parametric, revealing in dominant strategies, budget balanced, and approximately efficient if the consumer population is large. When applied to a public good with exclusion, this mechanism, in combination with consumer free mobility, yields approximately optimal allocations. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.