The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ledyard, JO; Palfrey, TR
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00161-4
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 153-171
• 关键词: Public goods; interim efficiency; voting; simple mechanisms

摘要

This paper compares the performance of simple voting rules, called referenda, to the performance of interim efficient mechanisms for the provision of a public good. In a referendum, voters simply vote for or against the provision of the public good, and production of the public good depends on whether or not the number of yes votes exceeds a prespecified threshold. Costs are shared equally. We show that in large populations for any interim efficient allocation rule, there exists a corresponding referendum that yields approximately the same total welfare when there are many individuals. Moreover, if there is a common value component to the voters' preferences, then there is a unique approximating referendum. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.