Delegation effects in representative democracies: do they foster extremism?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laussel, D
• 署名单位: Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00097-4
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 191-205
• 关键词: Representative democracy; Strategic delegation

摘要

We analyze the political equilibria of a model of representative democracy with strategic delegation where the policy which maximizes ex-ante the welfare of a citizen is not in general the one he would select ex-post if he were elected. We show that these effects give rise to an 'abstention effect' which is likely to lead to the unopposed election of extremist representatives and prevents policy convergence in two-candidate elections. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.