Fragmented fiscal policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Perotti, R; Kontopoulos, Y
• 署名单位: European University Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00146-3
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 191-222
• 关键词: Fiscal policy; FRAGMENTATION; ideology

摘要

This paper explores on a panel of 19 OECD countries the role of fragmentation indetermining fiscal outcomes over the 1970-95 period. We first define the notion of fragmentation of fiscal policy-making as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aggregate expenditure are internalized by individual decision-makers. Empirically, this notion has two key logical components: the number decision-makers and the rules of the game, or the budget process. In turn, the number of decision makers can refer to the number of parties in a coalition, or the number of ministers in the cabinet. We test all these determinants against each other, and against perhaps e oldest explanation of all, ideology. We show that cabinet size and, to a lesser degree, coalition size and ideology, are significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes. In particular, transfers are the budget items most affected by these factors. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.