The optimal elasticity of taxable income

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Slemrod, J; Kopczuk, W
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00095-0
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 91-112
• 关键词: Optimal income taxation; Tax avoidance; tax administration

摘要

The strength of the behavioral response to a tax rate change depends on the environment individuals operate in, and may be manipulated by instruments controlled by the government. We first derive a measure of the social benefit to affecting this elasticity. The paper then examines this effect in the solution to the optimal income taxation problem when such an instrument is available, first in a general model and then in an example when the government chooses the income tax base. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.