Working time regulation in a search economy with worker moral hazard

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rocheteau, G
• 署名单位: Australian National University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00087-1
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 387-425
• 关键词: working time; unemployment; matching; shirking

摘要

This paper analyzes the consequences of a working time reduction within an integrated shirking-matching model. Under laissez faire, workers and employers bargain over wages and working hours. When unemployment is high, the no-shirking condition is binding and the number of working hours is lower than the level that would be negotiated in the absence of unobservable shirking, In this case, a work-sharing policy increases aggregate employment. At the opposite, for low unemployment countries. the no-shirking condition does not bind and a working time regulation always worsens the labour market situation. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.