The politics of redistributive social insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hindriks, J; De Donder, P
• 署名单位: Universite Catholique Louvain; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00078-6
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 2639-2660
• 关键词: Majority rule; social insurance; redistribution; adverse selection

摘要

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.