Competition and the reform of incentive schemes in the regulated sector

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boyer, M
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Polytechnique Montreal; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Institut Universitaire de France; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00185-2
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1353-1381
• 关键词: incitations secteur public; concurrence; incitations secteur public

摘要

We consider a regulation problem with complete contracting in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and review within this model the various channels by which external competition parameters affect incentives within the regulated firm. The channels are: the principal's information, the principal's objective function, the agent's incentive constraint, the agent's participation constraint. We consider in particular a better information structure, a threat of liquidation, a fight for talent, a more efficient private sector, and the existence of better substitutes. We characterize in each case the conditions under which the effect on incentives is positive. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science BV All rights reserved.