The impact of fiscal incentives on student disability rates

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cullen, JB
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00203-1
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1557-1589
• 关键词: disability; financial incentives; moral hazard; special education

摘要

In this paper, I estimate the elasticity of student disability rates with respect to the generosity of state reimbursements. The classification response is identified from policy-induced variation in the amount of state aid generated by serving a disabled student across local school districts in Texas from 1991-1992 through 1996-1997. My central estimates imply that fiscal incentives can explain nearly 40% of the recent growth in student disability rates in Texas. The magnitude of the institutional response varies by district size and enrollment concentration, student race/ethnicity and the level of fiscal constraint. (C) 2001 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.