Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andersson, F; Konrad, KA
• 署名单位: Free University of Berlin; Free University of Berlin; Lund University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00201-8
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1539-1555
• 关键词: MIGRATION; education; GLOBALIZATION; COMMITMENT; time consistent income taxation

摘要

This paper considers education investment and public education policy in closed and open economies with an extortionary government. The extortionary government in a closed economy chooses an education policy in order to overcome a hold-up problem of time-consistent taxation similar to benevolent governments. The two types of government differ in their education policies if highly productive labor is mobile. Extortionary governments' incentives for a policy that stimulates higher private education efforts vanish; instead they have incentives to prevent individuals from mobility-increasing education investment. Tax competition therefore reduces hold-up problems of time-consistent extortionary taxation, but introduces other distortions that reduce workers' utility. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.