Paying politicians

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Messner, M; Polborn, MK
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.01.004
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 2423-2445
• 关键词: citizen-candidate model; political economy; private provision of public goods; wage for politicians

摘要

We consider a society that has to elect an official who provides a public service for the citizens. Potential candidates differ in their competence and every potential candidate has private information about his opportunity cost to perform the task of the elected official. We develop a new citizen candidate model with a unique equilibrium to analyze citizens' candidature decisions. Under some weak additional assumptions, bad candidates run with a higher probability than good ones, and for unattractive positions, good candidates free-ride on bad ones. We also analyze the comparative static effects of wage increases and cost of running on the potential candidates' entry decisions. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.