An economic theory of leadership turnover

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gallego, M; Pitchik, C
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Wilfrid Laurier University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.07.008
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 2361-2382
• 关键词: coup d'etat; kingmakers; dictator; hazard rate; dynamic; stochastic games; infinite horizon

摘要

In an infinite-horizon stochastic model, a coup not only disciplines a dictator's policy towards a group of kingmakers, but also enables a kingmaker to become a dictator. Greater competition for the dictator's position, a lower impact of the dictator's policy on the kingmakers, or lower risks of staging a coup raises the benefit of a coup relative to its opportunity cost and so raises the probability of a coup. Since periodic shocks affect the efficacy of the dictator's policy, a bad enough shock makes it too costly for even talented dictators to avert a coup. More talented dictators are able to survive more negative shocks, so the worst shock in a dictator's reign is informative about the probability of a coup. Conditional on the worst shock, the probability of a coup is independent of a dictator's duration in office. The unconditional probability declines with duration. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.