Public rationing and private cost incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ma, CTA
• 署名单位: Boston University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00163-9
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 333-352
• 关键词: rationing; cost incentive; contestable market; public and private sectors

摘要

This paper considers a public provider's strategic use of rationing in a market served by both public and private providers. Such a 'mixed' market structure is common in many industries such as health care, telecommunication, postal service, and public utilities. The technology in the private sector exhibits increasing returns: each firm can expend 'effort' in the form of fixed cost to reduce the marginal cost. Firms in the contestable private sector compete and the market equilibrium is characterized by average-cost pricing. The equilibrium private sector market size is too low, resulting in deficient cost effort Efficient rationing forces more consumers to use the private sector, restoring cost incentives and implementing the first best. Random rationing may reduce cost inefficiency but does not implement the first best. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.