When financial work incentives pay for themselves: evidence from a randomized social experiment for welfare recipients

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Michalopoulos, C; Robins, PK; Card, D
• 署名单位: University of Miami; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2002.02.001
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 5-29
• 关键词: welfare reform; financial incentives; welfare-to-work programs; labor supply; social experimentation

摘要

This paper summarizes early findings from a social experiment that provided financial incentives for new welfare recipients to leave welfare and work full time. The financial incentive was essentially a negative income tax with a requirement that people work at least 30 h/week. Early results show that the financial incentive increased full-time employment, earnings, and income, and reduced poverty. Furthermore, at the end of the period discussed in this paper, the program was paying for itself through increased tax revenues. (C) 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.