Tiebout and redistribution in a model of residential and political choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kessler, AS; Lülfesmann, C
• 署名单位: Simon Fraser University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.09.007
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 501-528
• 关键词: Local public goods; migration; Fiscal federalism; Tiebout

摘要

The paper considers a two-community model with freely mobile individuals. Individuals differ not only in their incomes, but also in their tastes for a local public good. In each jurisdiction, the amount of public services is determined by majority vote of the inhabitants, and local spending is financed by a residence-based linear income tax. When making their residential and political choices, individuals thus face a trade-off between the provisionary and redistributive effects of policies. We analyze this trade-off and show that Tiebout-like sorting equilibria often exist. If the spread in tastes among individuals is very large, an almost perfect sorting according to preferences emerges; otherwise, a partial sorting prevails and stratification into rich and poor communities is more pronounced. Importantly, we demonstrate that all these sorting equilibria exist whether or not individuals are allowed to relocate after voting. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.