Universal service obligations in LDCs: The effect of unifon-n pricing on infrastructure access

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Estache, Antonio; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Zhang, Xinzhu
• 署名单位: The World Bank; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.07.002
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1155-1179
• 关键词: universal service obligations; asymmetric information; collusion

摘要

This paper develops a model to analyze the impacts of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments: pricing and network investment. Under discriminatory pricing asymmetric information leads to a higher price and smaller network in the rural area than under full information. Under uniform pricing the price is also lower but the network is even smaller. In addition, under both pricing regimes not only the firm but also taxpayers have incentives to collude with the regulator. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.