Blame-game politics in a coalition government

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dellis, Arnaud
• 署名单位: University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.08.006
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 77-96
• 关键词: Reputation; delayed adoption of reforms; coalition government

摘要

Delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics. This paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision-making process, nor politicians' preferences for a reform. We show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption (thus delaying it until after the next election) and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non-adoption. We refer to this strategy as blame-game politics. We then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame-game. One is to make an issue salient in the next election. A second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate, which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue. A third reason is to enhance 'bargaining power' during the formation of the next government. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.