Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity: The role of affect

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Reuben, Ernesto; van Winden, Frans
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.012
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 34-53
• 关键词: reciprocity; affect; social ties; social norms; experiment

摘要

This is an experimental study of negative reciprocity in the case of multiple reciprocators. We use a three-player power-to-take game where a proposer is matched with two responders. We compare a treatment in which responders are anonymous to each other (strangers) with one in which responders know each other from outside the lab (friends). We focus on the responders' decisions, beliefs, and emotions. Our main findings are (1) friends punish the proposer more than strangers, (2) friends are more likely to coordinate their punishment (without communication), and (3) both punishment and coordination are explained by the responders' emotional reactions. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.