Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nikiforakis, Nikos
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 91-112
• 关键词: Public goods; Counter-punishment; revenge; decentralized punishment; Experimental economics

摘要

A number of experimental studies have shown that the opportunity to punish anti-social behavior increases cooperation levels when agents face a social dilemma. Using a public good experiment, I show that in the presence of counter-punishment opportunities cooperators are less willing to punish free riders. As a result, cooperation breaks down and groups have lower earnings in comparison to a treatment without punishments where free riding is predominant. Approximately one quarter of all punishments are retaliated. Counter-punishments appear to be driven partly by strategic considerations and partly by a desire to reciprocate punishments. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.