Efficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kind, Hans Jarle; Koethenbuerger, Marko; Schjelderup, Guttorm
• 署名单位: Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); University of Munich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.010
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1531-1539
• 关键词: two-sided markets; ad-valorem taxes; specific taxes; imperfect competition

摘要

This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by posing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.(c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.