Delegation versus communication in the organization of government

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ludema, Rodney D.; Ofsgard, Anders
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.009
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 213-235
• 关键词: Political economy; DELEGATION; COMMUNICATION; Organizational design; time inconsistency

摘要

When a government creates an agency to gather information relevant to policymaking, it faces two critical organizational questions: whether the agency should be given authority to decide on policy or merely supply advice, and what should the policy goals of the agency be. Existing literature on the first question is unable to address the second, because the question of authority becomes moot if the government can simply replicate its preferences within the agency. In contrast, this paper examines both questions within a model of policymaking under time inconsistency, a setting in which the government has a well-known incentive to create an agency with preferences that differ from its own. Thus, our framework permits a meaningful analysis of delegation versus communication with an endogenously chosen agent. The main result of the model is that governments prefer to delegate authority when the size of the time inconsistency problem is large relative to the uncertainty of the political consequences of the agent's policy choice, while they prefer to ask for advice if the opposite is true. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.