Optimum income taxation and layoff taxes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cahuc, Pierre; Zylberberg, AndrE
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.006
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 2003-2019
• 关键词: Layoff taxes; optimal taxation; job destruction

摘要

This paper analyzes optimum income taxation in a model with endogenous job destruction that gives rise to unemployment. It is shown that optimal tax schemes comprise both payroll and layoff taxes when the state provides public unemployment insurance and aims at redistributing income. The optimal layoff tax is equal to the social cost of job destruction, which amounts to the sum of unemployment benefits (that the state pays to unemployed workers) and payroll taxes (that the state does not get when workers are unemployed). (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.