Taxing education in Ramsey's tradition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Richter, Wolfram F.
• 署名单位: Dortmund University of Technology; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.09.005
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1254-1260
• 关键词: Endogenous choice of education; labour; and saving; Second-best efficient taxation; Linear instruments; Finite periods; Ramsey's Rule; Power Law of Learning

摘要

Assuming a two-period model with endogenous choices of labour, education, and saving, it is shown to be second-best efficient to deviate from Ramsey's Rule and to distort qualified labour less than nonqualified labour. Furthermore, if the earnings function displays constant elasticity, the choice of education should not be distorted. With the necessary qualifications the results extend to the case when taxpayers are heterogeneous and when the planner trades off efficiency against equity. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.