Tax competition with parasitic tax havens

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Slemrod, Joel; Wilson, John D.
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Michigan State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.08.004
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1261-1270
• 关键词: Tax competition; tax havens; Compliance costs

摘要

We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens. We demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven countries. We also demonstrate that the smaller countries choose to become tax havens, and we show that the abolition of a sufficiently small number of the relatively large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens. We argue that these results extend to the case where there are also taxes on wage income that involve administrative and compliance costs. (C) 2009 Published by Elsevier B.V.