Providing public goods in the absence of strong institutions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gerber, Anke; Wichardt, Philipp C.
• 署名单位: University of Hamburg; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.10.006
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 429-439
• 关键词: Public goods; COOPERATION; institutions; Climate-change treaties

摘要

This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establish positive contributions to public goods in the absence of powerful institutions to provide the public good and to sanction free-riders. in this mechanism players commit to the public good by paying a deposit prior to the contribution stage. If there is universal commitment, deposits are immediately refunded whenever a player contributes her specified share to the public good. If there is no universal commitment, all deposits are refunded and the standard game is played. For suitable deposits, prior commitment and full ex post contributions are supported as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the resulting game. As the mechanism obviates the need for any ex post prosecution of free-riders, it is particularly suited for situations where players do not submit to a common authority as in the case of international agreements. (c) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.