Strategic delegation and voting rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harstad, Bard
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.09.004
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 102-113
• 关键词: Strategic delegation; ELECTIONS; Collective decisions; Voting rules; Political systems; Decentralization v centralization

摘要

The selection of political representatives depends on the political system Principals, such as voters or districts. may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from themselves While a status-quo biased delegate may be a better negotiator, an enthusiastic representative has a better chance of being Included in the majority coalition A larger majority requirement leads to conservative delegation an hence a Status quo bias, a poor minority protection does the opposite Through strategic delegation, the political system also determines whether centralization or decentralization is beneficial (C) 2009 Elsevier B V. All rights reserved