The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hiriart, Yolande; Martimort, David; Pouyet, Jerome
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; Universite Marie et Louis Pasteur
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.005
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1008-1019
• 关键词: Risk regulation; monitoring; capture; Integration and separation

摘要

When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives and also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the optimal scope of monitoring depending on whether public monitors are benevolent or corruptible. We show that separating the ex ante and the ex post monitors increases the likelihood of ex post investigation, helps prevent capture and improves welfare. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.