A natural experiment on sick pay cuts, sickness absence, and labor costs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ziebarth, Nicolas R.; Karlsson, Martin
• 署名单位: Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; Technical University of Darmstadt
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.09.001
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1108-1122
• 关键词: Sickness absence; Statutory sick pay; Labor costs; natural experiment; SOEP

摘要

This study estimates the reform effects of a reduction in statutory sick pay levels on sickness absence behavior and labor costs. German federal law reduced the legal obligation of German employers to provide 100% continued wage pay for up to six weeks per sickness episode. In 1996 statutory sick pay was decreased to 80% of foregone gross wages. Within the reform's target group - private sector employees - this measure increased the proportion of employees having zero days of absence between 6 and 8%. Quantile regression estimates indicate that employees with up to 5.5 annual absence days reduced their days of absence by about 12%. Extended analyses suggest that in industries that enforced the cut, behavioral effects were about twice as large. We show that the direct labor cost savings effect stemming from the cut in replacement levels clearly exceeds the indirect effect due to the decrease in absenteeism. Our calculations about the total decrease in labor costs are very much in line with official data which suggest that total employer-provided sick pay decreased by 6.7% or (sic)1.7 billion per year. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.