The taxation of life annuities under adverse selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Direr, A.
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Orleans; Paris School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.11.006
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 50-58
• 关键词: Optimal taxation; asymmetric information; Life cycle models and saving

摘要

This paper studies how annuities should be taxed in a Mirrlees-type model in the presence of adverse selection and a positive link between income and longevity The government is able to address the adverse selection problem by implementing a progressive marginal tax rate oil annuities This amounts to subsidizing small annuities (purchased by low incomes) and taxing large annuities (purchased by high incomes) Numerical Simulations suggest that the taxation is significant and becomes more pronounced as annuitants get older (C) 2009 Elsevier B V All rights reserved