Flip-flopping from primaries to general elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hummel, Patrick
• 署名单位: Yahoo! Inc
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.08.006
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1020-1027
• 关键词: Flip-flopping; Primary elections; General elections; Policy selection

摘要

I consider a model in which candidates must win a primary election to compete in the general election. Candidates may choose different policies in the primary and the general election, but doing so results in accusations of flip-flopping. I show that candidates adopt extreme policies in the primaries but then try to move closer to the center for the general election even though primary voters are forward-looking and anticipate this policy moderation. The extent to which candidates move closer to the center is constrained by flip-flopping costs, and candidates choose divergent policies in the general election. I obtain comparative statics results on candidate policy choices in terms of voter preferences. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.